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“You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” [1]
-Scott McNealy, Sun Microsystems
While secrecy and integrity policies are most often
crafted for protection of corporate (e.g., commercial,
educational and government) information, we understand
privacy policies to be targeted toward the protection of
information for and about individuals. The purpose of
this panel is to focus on how new technologies are
affecting privacy.
Identification of technologies that might adversely
affect privacy was made by Turn [2][3] at this
Symposium, and included:
• Electronic funds transfer records (we include credit
cards in 2000)
• Electronic mail monitoring tools
• Automated home services, including e-commerce
and information on request
• Home monitoring services for security, health and
energy management
• Use of smart cards
• Mobile computers in the transportation system
• Implanted medical and locating devices
• Linking of integrated personal information record
keeping systems
Despite the historical lack of support for privacy
research on the part of government, military and industry,
it is encouraging to see recent developments in theory,
techniques and products to support the “Privacy” part of
“Security & Privacy” (e.g., see “proponent” panelists,
below). However, it seems clear that the science of
privacy is in its infancy, and there are more questions on
the table than answers.
Privacy policies, as stated above, might be considered
to be a special case of secrecy, but how do the
technologies differ? We wonder whether privacy policies
generally require technical support that is different in
kind from those mechanisms and systems that support
secrecy policies? If so, do some of the lessons learned in
development of secrecy/integrity systems apply to
privacy? For example, can effective privacy be designed
in after the fact, or will today's systems-in-development
become obsolete if they are required to rigorously
enforce privacy policies? Should we consider privacy to
be a fundamental component of computer security as a
whole, just as are integrity, availability, etc.?
New information collection, derivation and extraction
technologies are emerging which have the potential for
the massive automated violation of individual privacies.
We are concerned with the advancement of technology in
the area of personal data acquisition without the co-
development of attending assurances of privacy.   Can
some of the new privacy approaches be used in the
responsible development of information accumulation
systems?
Panel Structure
We see several camps of new/newer technology and
technologists relevant to the privacy debate:





• Information accumulating technology
Explicit, e.g.:
-On-line Profiling services










-Law Enforcement and Intelligence
For this panel, we have invited individuals from the
first and third camps. Left out then, are the purveyors of
information accumulation technology (e.g., “on-line
profiling”), who might want to argue that their techniques
are non-bypassable, or that their technology does not
invade privacy, or might want to suggest technical
antidotes. Alternatively these folks might want to argue
that if an individual wants access to new technology, e.g.
a smart refrigerator that ensures it is always stocked by
invoking automatic deliveries, then he must give up his
privacy, and that these new technologies are impossible
without giving up privacy. In any case, we decided to
frame the panel discussion without representation from
this (second) camp.
The panelists have been encouraged to provide a
technical discussion as to whether electronic privacy is
achievable. While philosophical or political commentary
regarding privacy can be thought provoking, we believe
that a technical exploration of the effects on privacy of
new technologies is a better contribution to the
Symposium at this time.
We will initiate the discussion as a pseudo debate. The
resolution of the debate will be: “Electronic Privacy can
be Achieved.” It is intended that each proponent's initial
statement will narrow the resolution to a specific
“proposition” regarding the privacy properties of a
particular technology. We are interested in understanding
how their products/techniques work. The opponents will
question the effectiveness of the privacy mechanisms.
We are interested in how well these technologies stand
up to scrutiny.
In the end, this debate is intended to shed some light
on the new privacy technologies and their ability to
provide personal privacy in the information age.
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